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Care, laboratory beagles and affective utopia 
 
Abstract:  
A caring approach to knowledge production has been portrayed as epistemologically radical, 
ethically vital and as fostering continuous responsibility between researchers and research-
subjects. This article examines these arguments through focusing on the ambivalent role of 
care within the first large-scale experimental beagle colony, a self-professed ‘beagle utopia’ 
at the University of California, Davis, (1951-1986). We argue that care was at the core of the 
beagle colony; the lived environment was re-shaped in response to animals ‘speaking back’ 
to researchers, and ‘love’ and ‘kindness’ were important considerations during staff 
recruitment. Ultimately, however, we show that care-relations were used to manufacture 
compliancy, preventing the predetermined ends of the experiment from being troubled. 
Rather than suggesting Davis would have been less ethically troubling, or more 
epistemologically radical, with ‘better’ care, however, we suggest the case troubles existing 
care theory and argue that greater attention needs to be paid to histories, contexts, and 
exclusions.  
Keywords: affect, care, animals, embodied communication, laboratory science, ethics, dogs   
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Care, laboratory beagles and affective utopia 
 
…our primary objective was to establish an ecologic balance or utopic 
environment that would minimise the over-all effects of stresses and stressors. 
(Andersen & Goldman, 1960: 131). 
This article complicates arguments that have been made about the ethical and epistemic 
importance of care; arguments which have gained currency in a range of (often overlapping) 
academic contexts, including cultural studies (Despret, 2013; Haraway, 2008; Latimer & 
Miele, 2013), cultural geography (Greenhough, 2010; McEwan & Goodman, 2010), and 
science and technology studies (Mol et al, 2010; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). To flesh out a 
more critical account of care we focus on the ‘utopic environment’ described above: The first 
large-scale experimental beagle colony that was developed and run at University of 
California Davis between 1951 and 1986. Funded by the Manhattan Project, this colony’s 
primary function was to test the long-term effects of radiation.  However, it was also intended 
to be a model beagle colony where lessons – in architectural design, management and care-
practices – could be learned for future initiatives. Researchers’ arresting accounts of the 
colony as a beagle utopia, where affective human-animal encounters were not only allowed to 
flourish but actively shape the research environment, are – seemingly – illustrative of the 
conceptual and practical importance of care. Care was integral in learning about the animals’ 
needs,  needs which shaped the colony’s own design and ethical procedures in a profound 
way and went on to shape future laboratory practice. Yet care at Davis was (in Donna 
Haraway’s terms) ‘non-innocent’ and used to facilitate practices that (in retrospect) seem 
questionable. The striking account of this beagle utopia, as detailed below, is only half of the 
story, however, as the messy role of care in the colony has broader theoretical resonance, 
complicating existing claims about the ethical and epistemological value of care. 
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Before examining care’s role in this specific context, we explore some of the recent 
conceptualisations of care that – though constituting a heterogeneous body of work – 
consistently emphasise its importance for crafting not only more ethical but more 
epistemologically radical forms of knowledge. These claims are then complicated through a 
sustained focus on Davis, which leads into our concluding discussion about what can be 
learned from interrogating some of the less ‘innocent’ qualities of care. 
The importance of care    
It has been argued that care not only does (Pickersgill, 2012) but should play an integral role 
in scientific knowledge production and medical work. If care is more comprehensively 
accommodated into technoscientific practice, it is claimed, then this is ethically valuable, 
enabling researchers to respond to the needs and demands of those being researched (Despret, 
2004; Despret, 2013). It is also claimed that care has epistemological value, facilitating more 
responsive relationships between researchers and research-subjects and making it difficult to 
manipulate subjects into merely conforming with pre-established assumptions (Stengers, 
1997; Stengers, 2010; Stengers, 2011). Care has thus been depicted as enabling research-
subjects to ‘speak back’ in some way and, in line with Isabelle Stengers, ‘speaking back’ is 
what distinguishes ‘good’ from ‘bad’ science. For Stengers, conversely, if what is studied is 
prevented from ‘speaking back’ scientific practice is undermined because ‘the research has 
been done with the ulterior motive of imposing an answer on it’ (McClintock in Stengers, 
1997: 126).  
There are, however, difficulties  in facilitating an environment wherein research subjects may 
‘speak back’, especially when the subjects under consideration are ‘lively’; as Matei Candea 
argues: ‘Animal and human objects, unlike atoms or cells, are more easily affected by 
“obligations” (rules and constraints imposed by experimenters) and may find it harder to 
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impose their own “requirements” on the scientist’ (Candea, 2013: 57). It is difficult in such 
instances to create the space Stengers demands to ‘ensure the object [of study] has been given 
every chance to “object” to the theories and assumptions of the scientist’ (Candea, 2013: 
108). In research with lively subjects, therefore, care is framed as being particularly important 
in overcoming the problem of obligation, because care-taking practices enable researchers to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of what research-subjects’ needs are and respond to 
them accordingly (Davies, 2012; Greenhough, & Roe 2011). 
Tinkering and affect     
Caring approaches are therefore understood as processes of relationship-formation which are 
attentive to the needs of others (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). Caring is fundamentally 
relational; a mode of engagement wherein responsibility is taken for our engagements and 
their effects on others (Stiegler, 2010). It is the relational nature of care, moreover, which 
obliges researchers to respond to the needs of those they work with, be they human patients 
(Silverman, 2012), primates (Haraway, 1991), rodents (Despret, 2004; Davies, 2012; Davies, 
2013), cells (Stengers, 2010; Stengers, 2011) or even atoms (Barad, 2007).1  
What this care ‘looks like’, however, cannot be reduced to a universal set of principles (Puig 
de la Bellacasa, 2011). Care, instead, is said to emerge through mundane working practices 
that are particular to the settings it unfolds within, settings shown to include research 
laboratories (Despret, 2004); care-homes (Moser, 2010); hospitals (Mol, 2008) and farms  
(Harbers, 2010; Singleton, 2010). These context-specific care practices often elude formal 
ethical guidelines and procedures, either because they are tacit in nature (Holmberg, 2008) or 
because they evolve from somatic relations (Greenhough & Roe, 2011). Instead of reliance 
upon guidelines, therefore, realizing care in practice involves ‘tinkering’ with existing socio-
technical infrastructures.  Such ‘tinkering’ is required both to respond to the needs of those 
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being worked with and because negotiations need to take place concerning ‘how different 
goals […] might coexist in a given, specific, local practice’ (Mol et al, 2010: 13). 
Importantly, though care might ultimately serve to support socio-economic systems, even in 
the most instrumental contexts care cannot be reduced to economic imperatives or be wholly 
contained by systemic parameters (Harbers, 2010).  
An overlapping body of work stresses the affective dimension of caring practices, framing 
care as an ‘affective state’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011: 89) with a vital role in ‘re-affecting 
objectified worlds’ (98). Affect – in contrast to relational understandings of care – is taken to 
be a quality of actors that designates their capacity to affect others and be affected in turn 
(Lee, 2008: 66).2 Care and affect are, therefore, tightly bound. The value of care lies in its 
capacity to combat instrumentalization through creating the space to affect and be affected. 
Affect, meanwhile, strengthens care work because the affective relations between research 
partners create further space to learn what animals are articulating through their behaviour 
(Dror, 1999; Holmberg, 2008; Davies, 2012). Vinciane Despret describes this as an ‘affected 
perspective’ where ‘the scientist risks being touched/affected by what matters for the animal 
he/she observes’ (Despret, 2013: 57). It is through such relations that animals can be enabled 
to ‘speak back’ in ways that reshape their environment.  
Problems with care 
Work that stresses the importance of care, however, has also pointed to the difficulties of 
realizing it in practice, with care depicted as frequently lying in tension with an ever-
increasing desire to regulate care-practices. Regulation could be for the purpose of control (as 
with systems in place to regulate cattle movement (Singleton, 2010)), to make practices easy 
to standardize (as with care-guidelines for laboratory mice (Davies, 2012)), for economic 
reasons (as with procedures prescribed in the wake of the 2001 foot and mouth crisis (Law, 
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2010)), or for all three. For Mol et al, the tensions between regulation and the tacit nature of 
care mean that if the former wins out then this: ‘threatens to take the heart of out care – and 
along with this not just its kindness but also its effectiveness its tenacity and its strength’ 
(Mol et al, 2010: 7). The affective qualities of care, therefore, are often depicted as being in 
tension with ‘economic and organizational’ requirements and ‘commitments to scientific 
epistemologies’ that side-line the importance of care (Davies, 2012: 629). 
Further, warnings have been made about valorising embodied relations (Latimer, 2013: 98) 
and of care itself becoming an ‘epistemological standard’ required for making ‘better 
knowledge’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). Haraway (2008) and Despret’s (2013), respective, 
emphasis on care’s ‘non-innocent’ qualities even implicate it in processes that might have a 
detrimental effect on research partners, processes which include killing. Despite these issues, 
care is described as providing a way of ‘staying with the trouble’; a refusal to settle ethical or 
epistemological matters by delegating them to rules, guidelines and values that are decided in 
advance (Haraway, 2011). Indeed, care has explicitly been opposed to ‘other traditions of 
ethics and especially to the ethics of justice’ that predetermines what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ care 
(Mol et al, 2010), because such approaches shut down potential for continuous responsibility 
between researchers and research subjects. 
What is revealed through focusing on Davis, however, is that these arguments need to be 
complicated further, taking into account what happens when care itself forecloses certain 
forms of responsibility. The role of care  at Davis, we argue, cannot be accounted for by 
claiming that, while all relations are non-innocent, care’s emergence – in often adverse 
conditions – still holds potential for an ethics (Despret, 2013; Haraway, 2008). Nor can these 
problems be overcome by recognising the different values in play in care contexts  and 
identifying tensions between the multiple forms of care that could exist in particular sites 
(e.g. Law, 2010). The laboratory beagles we focus on demonstrate that care is not always in 
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negotiation with or opposed to instrumental forces. In certain contexts care is precisely what 
enables the instrumentalization of life, in being used to gain knowledge about entities that 
can be exploited for the purpose of control.   
At Davis caring relations did exist between researchers and beagles; for example, there was a 
good deal of ‘tinkering’ with ways in which to maximise animals’ well-being within the 
constraints of the experimental context and affective encounters were not only 
accommodated but encouraged. These processes, though, did not ultimately expand the 
animals’ opportunities to ‘object’, but were designed to control them more efficiently, to 
mould the animals into ‘experimental dogs’.  Indeed the beagles at Davis muddy distinctions 
between care and systemic imperatives. The affective encounters taking place within the 
colony actively enabled the laboratory’s systems to maintain and reproduce themselves.  
Researchers gained knowledge about the animals through caring practices and, in turn, this 
knowledge was then acted on and re-shaped caring practices in order to undermine the dogs’ 
need to ‘object’ in disruptive ways. Despite these problems, care was still afforded a pivotal 
role and thus the work at Davis cannot simply be read in terms of a straight-forward narrative 
of  instrumentalization, or even framed in relation to more complex socio-economic concepts 
that examine the animals’ role as biocapital (e.g. Shukin, 2009; Twine, 2010).  Rather than 
labelling engagements with beagles ‘uncaring’ on a post hoc basis, we argue that a more 
critical theory of care itself is needed. The colony’s conceptual significance, therefore, lies 
not in its capacity to deepen understanding of the laboratory per se but in the challenge it 
poses to theoretical accounts of care, both in the laboratory and – crucially – elsewhere, 
which contend that care is what opens space for  nonanthropocentric forms of ethics and 
epistemological transformation. At stake in examining the ambivalent role of care in this 
context, in other words, is maintaining space to ask wider questions about ‘for whom, for 
what and by whom’ research takes place (Haraway, 2008: 87), in order to guard against care 
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being used to reinforce pre-existing (experimental) research epistemologies and ethical values 
rather than transforming them.  
Background and materials 
In order to elucidate the role of care within beagle-research, we focus upon work which took 
place at The Radiobiology Laboratory at Davis. In addition to the colony still being cited in 
the literature as a touchstone for research (Tomkins et al, 2011), in methodological terms our 
focus on this particular case study takes a lead from previous work that has drawn on 
privileged historical sites of experimental research to tease out the tensions and potentials of 
contemporary laboratory work (e.g. Haraway, 1991, 1997; Despret, 2004, 2013). This 
approach also complements ethnographic analyses of human-animal relations, by responding 
to recent calls to move beyond immediate laboratory encounters and expand on the histories 
that form the context of this research (Johnson, 2015).  
Our analysis of the research at Davis was largely possible because the experimenters firmly 
believed themselves to be at the forefront of animal experimentation.  Between them, the 
academics at Davis published a great deal of research concerned not with radiobiology but, 
rather, the establishment and maintenance of a large, experimental, ‘model’ beagle colony 
intended to shape all the other similar projects which would surely follow in its wake.  Thus, 
a critical reading of a range of printed sources originating from within the laboratory – 
Annual Progress Reports, conference proceedings, journal articles, and a 600 page textbook 
entitled The Beagle as an Experimental Dog (Andersen, 1970) – form the core of our 
analysis. These primary, historical, documents are supplemented by a range of sources 
emerging after the conclusion of the experiments.  These pieces include a Governmental 
report concerning the environmental impact of the study, newspaper articles, online sources, 
and preexisting interviews conducted with researchers.   
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Two intimately related projects took place at The Radiobiology Laboratory at Davis; the first, 
‘Project Four’, commenced in 1951 with the ambition of studying the long-term effects of 
sub-lethal and mid-lethal x-irradiation exposure (Andersen & Hart, 1955: 366).  The second, 
‘Project Six’, commenced in 1957 and examined the consequences of continuous low level 
ingestion of radionuclides (McKelvie & Andersen, 1966: 25).  These projects were funded by 
The Atomic Energy Commission, known prior to 1954 as The Manhattan Project.  Further, 
the work at Davis was part of a larger network of similarly funded research centres, situated 
across the United States, attempting to gain insights into the effects of radiation exposure 
through the use of beagles as animal models (McKelvie et al, 1971: 264).  This network, 
contemporary sources have suggested, was known as ‘the Beagle Club’ (Paddock, 1994: A1).  
Outside of the Beagle Club, independent research intent on consolidating the beagle as the 
laboratory breed of choice was also taking place in both the United States (e.g. Reinert & 
Smith, 1963) and the United Kingdom (e.g. Appleton & Appleton, 1967).  
While we will engage in a fuller examination of the material features of the experimental 
environment at Davis, it is worth briefly noting the basic architecture of the site in order to 
give a sense of the project in question.   
[Figure 1 to come here – picture of colony] 
The project was big both geographically (the site ultimately occupied 15 acres of land 
(Dames & Moore, 1995: 8)) and financially (costing approximately $16 million (Wagner, 
2011)).  There was space to hold approximately 200 dogs in indoor kennels and it was 
standard practice for puppies to be weaned in these cages until the age of 19 months 
(Andersen, 1964: 296).  Once weaned, dogs were moved outside; both Projects Four and Six 
had the capacity to hold between four and five hundred dogs within two-dog pens (Andersen 
& Goldman, 1960: 129).  In total, 1063 female beagles were exposed to radiation (Dames & 
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Moore, 1995: 60) although, when we consider the initial breeding colony of 80 bitches and 7 
dogs, female control subjects and male dogs that were utilized elsewhere or sold into the 
community, it becomes clear the total number of animals to have passed through the doors of 
the facility must have been far greater.  The site finally closed in 1986, when the final beagle 
died, although concerns over radiation exposure and attempts to safely dispose of 1000 
beagle corpses and 35 years’ worth of radioactive faeces ensure that the experiment’s half-
life is of a long duration.    
Following an examination of the research at Davis, we contest that the beagle experiments 
are infused, from beginning to end, with care; care that both facilitated and was shaped by the 
type of ‘affected perspective’ described by Despret.  Affective encounters directed from 
beagle to beagle, from beagle to human, from human to beagle, and from human to human 
were enabled, and informed the experimental design, process, and the material experimental 
space itself.  Ample space was provided for the ‘objects to object’ in a wide variety of ways 
and the material reality of experiment was demonstrably altered and shaped by these 
objections.  Nonetheless, we contest that although, and indeed because, this infusion of affect 
forms the foundation for ‘better care’, affect is constructed as an instrument of the researcher, 
something mundane  that is considered alongside economic and technical matters during 
experimental design.  Though this could be seen as a form of ‘tinkering’, and demonstrably 
created certain ethical obligations for researchers, therefore, care was ultimately utilized to 
meet predetermined experimental goals.   
Affecting the design 
Why beagles? 
The increasing use of beagles in the years following the Second World War appears to have 
been a response to increasing discontent with the use of ‘random source’ or ‘normal’ dogs 
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(Zinn, 1968: 1883).3  Arguments in favour of a move away from normal dogs had both 
ethical and epistemic components and were laden with considerations of affect (e.g. Burch, 
1959: 805-806).  The beagle itself quickly became established as the standardised laboratory 
dog for it had a vast number of characteristics it had in its favour.  As researchers at Davis 
note:  
The most desirable qualities of the Beagle as an experimental dog are its medium size, 
moderate length of hair coat in two or more colors, even temperament, adaptability to 
living in groups, representative conformation of the dog, and the lack of need for 
cosmetic surgery.  The Beagle's excellent disposition and gay personality are two its 
greatest assets, because special handling is seldom necessary and a minimum amount 
of restraint is required for most experimental procedures.  Its excellent disposition is 
the result of culling ill-tempered dogs throughout the history of the breed.  Although a 
wide range of behavior traits can be identified in the Beagle, they rarely show 
aggressiveness, timidity, or shyness. (Andersen, 1970: 4) 
In this extract it can be seen quite clearly that the beagle’s affective qualities, for instance its 
‘excellent disposition’ and ‘gay personality’, are among its ‘greatest assets’ and have been 
taken into explicit consideration by the researchers at Davis, alongside other mundane 
qualities like size and hair length, when determining it to be the experimental breed of choice.  
It is worth stressing that this above quotation is not a one-off; the same desirable 
characteristics of the beagle are stressed repeatedly by researchers both at Davis (e.g. 
Andersen & Goldman, 1960: 129; Solarz, 1970: 453) and elsewhere (Reinert & Smith, 1963: 
73; Scott 1970: 723; Zinn 1968: 1885).  Indeed, the division between affect and economy is 
muddied here; because ‘special handling’ is rarely needed with the beagle and because they 
do not need to be ‘restrained’ (and pictures of the veterinarians at work at Davis (e.g., 
(McKelvie & Andersen, 1966: 32) show, perhaps performatively, examinations being 
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conducted without as much as a leash) the beagle’s gay personality actually makes the 
experiment cheaper to run and makes the already-articulated goals of the experiment easier to 
achieve.   
What is also significant about these experiments is that affect, and the care-giving practices it 
feeds into, does not simply exist on a tacit level. What is seen in beagle research is decisively 
not the process of ‘forgetting’ described by Gail Davies in relation to animal research more 
broadly, wherein: ‘The extended scientific community has repeatedly been able to forget, or 
strategically ignore, the ways in which the affective states and environmental situations of 
animals may contribute to experimental outcomes’ (Davies, 2012: 629). In contrast with this 
account, affect here is documented, seen as integral to ‘good science’ by researchers 
themselves and, as will be discussed in the following section, acts as a model for future 
practice.  
Moulding a model colony: Affect in practice 
Designing utopia 
As mentioned previously, the researchers at Davis saw the Radiobiology Laboratory as a 
model colony; the beagle was only just becoming the standardised dog for laboratory practice 
and lessons would be learnt at Davis which could be passed down to future researchers.  
What becomes apparent is that care is absolutely central to the project  – the importance of 
the ‘well-being’ of the dogs is repeatedly stressed (Andersen, 1964: 300; Andersen & 
Goldman, 1960: 135; Andersen & Hart, 1955: 366; McKelvie & Andersen, 1966: 25) and 
treating the dogs in a ‘humane’ manner (Andersen, 1955: 410) is understood to be both 
ethically and epistemologically important.  Indeed, the ‘tranquillity of experimental animals 
throughout a life span’ (Andersen & Hart, 1955: 370) is stated to be crucial.  It is even stated 
that ‘our primary objective was to establish an ecologic balance or utopic environment that 
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would minimise the over-all effects of stresses and stressors’ (Andersen & Goldman, 1960: 
131).   
Here, we argue that the path of predetermined experimental progress was lubricated via a 
successful manipulation of the experimental space; a manipulation which exploited not only 
the affective qualities of the beagle but also the caring-relations between the beagles and the 
caretakers and laboratory technicians who were employed to work with them.  Research-
subjects (both caretakers and beagles) were moulded into ‘model’ objects and their objections 
and desires pacified so that they could not threaten experimental goals. Any actor who could 
not be sufficiently moulded to the experiment was removed from the site. It is, however, 
difficult to dismiss these practices as simply ‘uncaring’ because these experiments display the 
attributes that are integral to existing theories of care (as illustrated by the pivotal role of 
affect and constant ‘tinkering’ in response to the animals’ needs). To label the practices as 
Davis ‘bad care’ would thus necessitate an external position of judgement, a position 
rendered impossible by existing care-theories in their refusal to universalize or appeal to 
totalizing principles of social justice (Haraway, 1997; Haraway, 2008; Haraway, 2011; Mol 
et al, 2010). We suggest, therefore, that care theories need to take these tensions further into 
account, and guard against care being utilized for instrumental ends that inhibit ethical and 
epistemological change.    
Manipulating Affect 
What we seek to show here is that accommodating care does not necessarily create a more 
ethically responsive and epistemologically open laboratory; care at Davis was not just 
permitted but actively encouraged, documented and celebrated, yet it ultimately served as a 
mechanism of control.  This intent is made explicitly clear in the following extract:  
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…the Beagle has an excellent disposition which can be effected depending upon 
kennel management and environment.  For example, Beagle pups raised in 
isolation become wild or skitish, an undesirable trait in any experimental 
animal.  In our kennel, 2 or 3 litters of weaned pups were placed in a large pen 
adjacent to a well-traveled road to allow human contact.  This resulted in 
Beagles which later welcomed handling by kennel personnel.  The handling of 
pups early in life to reduce the ‘critical distance’ illustrates one of the many 
facets entering into successful operation of a Beagle kennel.  Even though the 
qualities of the Beagle as an experimental dog are excellent, they can be greatly 
improved by the researcher having kindness, interest, and practical experience in 
the handling of this breed. (Andersen, 1970: 7) 
 
It is clear from this extract that the researchers at Davis believe that systematically 
manipulating the affective responses of beagles by ‘allowing human contact’ and ‘having 
kindness’ is of great epistemic importance and will smooth the experimental progress.  
Resonating with Candea’s argument that animals ‘may find it harder to impose their own 
‘requirements’ on the scientist’ (Candea, 2013: 57), these practices seemingly give animals 
space to ‘speak back’ whilst actually minimizing the risk of future ‘objections’ troubling the 
predetermined ends of the experiment. In the following section we detail the ways in which 
this manipulation of affect, via care-taking processes, occurred in practice.  We show that 
caring practices shape the physical design of the pens, the daily procedures, the agents 
(human and canine) given access to the experimental space, and the form of interactions 
between those agents (both intra- and inter-species).  
Care and the physical environment 
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The pens at Davis were approximately 13ft by 29 ft (Andersen & Hart, 1955: 367) and each 
contained two dogs.  The floor was covered in crushed rock and from the centre of each pen 
rose a stanchion and platform, under which were attached two beer or wine kegs in which the 
beagles could sleep and shelter.  These pens were arranged in two-wide-by-twelve-deep rows 
with an adjacent pen down one side and a walkway down from which personnel could gain 
access to the animals down the other.  Animals were fed once daily and had access to an 
automatic watering device (see figure 1).  The researchers claim that ‘companionship, 
exercise, control of parasites, ease of cleaning, and minimum cost contributed to final 
decisions on design of the pens’ (McKelvie & Andersen, 1966: 25). 
It is clear that an affected perspective drastically shaped this eventual layout.  Firstly, the size 
and shape of the pens was determined by the social needs of the dogs, with other options 
discarded when the beagles appeared to show discontent: 
The wandering tendency [of beagles] can be minimized with pens of adequate 
size arranged for companionship and social activity.  Previous studies gave 
evidence that rectangular pens (1 pen: 2 dogs) providing at least 10 sq. ft. per 
inch of body height are satisfactory when dogs are kept in pairs.  Pens of other 
shapes and sizes resulted in uneven surface coverage by the dogs and 
encouraged digging or fence jumping. (Andersen & Goldman, 1960: 129-130) 
‘Pacing’, or ‘uneven surface coverage’, ‘digging’ and ‘fencing jumping’ are the forms of 
‘objection’ most frequently described by the researchers and, as evidenced in the above 
quote, modifications took place in order to quell such behaviours.  Affective encounters were 
thus used to gain knowledge about what mattered to the dogs, which then shaped their living 
environment; this process, however, served to ameliorate the risk of animals’ future 
objections disrupting the experiment. 
Eva Giraud and Gregory Hollin 
 
16 
 
Similarly, the number of dogs to a pen, and the positioning of the pens in relation to each 
other, is described as meeting the dogs’ approval, letting each animal’s own ‘personality’ 
flourish.  Once again, the animals’ objections – pacing, jumping, digging – have been taken 
into account and the space altered in order to increase ‘contentment’: 
Frequent, and often serious, quarrels develop if more than 2 dogs are kept 
together.  A single dog within a large pen either becomes lethargic or develops 
some undesirable traits such as pacing, digging, or jumping… A social 
relationship between paired dogs adds to their contentment.  Four adjacent pens 
separated by fencing permits muzzle contact between 8 dogs.  We have 
confirmed that a social relationship does exist within a given group, with 
introverts and extroverts exhibiting characteristic moods.  For example, females 
in estrus commonly prefer isolation to a group meeting at the corner of their 
pens.  Thus the adjacent arrangements of pens favors a voluntary social 
relationship without jeopardizing the dogs’ well being… (Andersen & Goldman, 
1960: 134)  
This process is seemingly illustrative of the ‘tinkering’ necessary to realise care within 
contexts shaped by technoscientific imperatives. The authors’ take pains to demonstrate that a 
great deal of trial, error, and accommodation has gone into the pen design at Davis and that 
other researchers would be wise to follow their designs.  The beagles are described as being 
content within their environment.  After listening to the animals’ desires, the beagles no 
longer object to their confinement: 
This arrangement [of the pens] adds to contentment of the experimental animals 
and makes restraining barbed wire above the fence unnecessary.  Approximately 
400 dogs have been raised and kept within a 5-ft. fence and none has jumped the 
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enclosure.  Animals removed from their permanent quarters appear lost and 
show a desire to return to their respective pens. (Andersen & Hart, 1955: 371) 
What we want to stress, in the light of these considerations, is that the researchers were not 
merely accommodating the affective qualities of the beagles.  Rather, as shown in the 
previous section, they were learning from them in order to actively manipulate these 
qualities, moulding the animals into ‘experimental dogs’: the researcher ‘having kindness’ 
greatly improves the qualities of the beagle within a laboratory setting.  Care is an instrument 
of both ethical and epistemic import and certainly creates space for affect, but, in this 
instance, knowledge is not transformed under the influence of care, as existing theories might 
anticipate. Instead care is used to transform research-subjects.  The researchers use and 
acquire knowledge about care in order to mould the beagles and ensure their compliance, 
with affect serving as a powerful tool in this acquisition of knowledge. On one level Davis 
thus illustrates the forms of human-animal engagement advocated by theories which have 
highlighted the ‘non-innocent’ function of care and acknowledged that the purpose of 
minimizing animal stress is often to manage animals more easily (Haraway, 2008: 83; 
Despret, 2013: 70). One another level, however, it troubles these theories’ epistemological 
and ethical claims, specifically the assertion that – despite its sometimes ‘non-innocent’ role 
– care nonetheless fosters responsibility that even extends to bringing ‘the enterprise to a halt’ 
if necessary (Haraway, 2008: 82). When focusing on the inter-agential relations at Davis, for 
instance, care can be seen as reinforcing experimental norms, rather than creating possibilities 
to transform them.    
Care and the inter-agent environment 
At Davis, the affective responses of the beagle were not only controlled through a 
manipulation of the physical environment but also through an active policing of the agents – 
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both human and canine – that particular individuals came into contact with, for how long, and 
under what circumstances.  Once again, these manipulations were intended to make 
experimentation on the beagles easier to conduct and care-taking practices played a pivotal 
role.  
One particular area of concern was the amount of contact that beagles had with humans for, 
as mentioned previously, contact between humans and beagles made the animals easier to 
handle within the laboratory.  For example, a previously referenced paper states that ‘2 or 3 
litters of weaned pups were placed in a large pen adjacent to a well-traveled road to allow 
human contact.  This resulted in Beagles which later welcomed handling by kennel 
personnel’ (Andersen, 1970: 7).  The researchers took other steps, in areas over which they 
had a great deal more control than the amount of passing traffic, to ensure frequent contact 
between beagles and humans.   
The pathways down one side of each kennel allowed frequent human-beagle contact and it 
was believed to be desirable for humans to enter the pens on a frequent basis.  The search for 
an economically viable means of ensuring frequent contact, in order to facilitate experimental 
ends, resulted in the use of crushed rock as a floor surface in the pens; a decision made, 
partially, because it forced contact between caretakers and dogs.  As is repeatedly (Andersen 
& Goldman, 1960: 130; Andersen & Hart, 1955: 370) noted:   
The use of a crushed rock pen surface means that fecal material must be 
manually removed to keep the pens clean.  Manual removal of fecal material 
necessitates a daily human-animal association, which is an asset in handling the 
Beagles for experimental procedures.  It has been determined that caretakers are 
inside a dog pen about 1 1/2 minutes a day. (Andersen, 1970: 14)  
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As the researchers were aware that, for beagles, as little as 8 minutes contact time per week 
was required to socialise the dogs (Solarz, 1970: 462) and minimise the ‘critical distance’, the 
choice of this surfacing was both economically viable and affectively productive, combining 
what are repeatedly articulated as the two variables of foremost consideration when designing 
the experiment.  Indeed, it was even recommended that the experiment would progress more 
smoothly if laboratory personnel were likely to form caring relationships with the animals.  
When making appointments, ‘personality traits which could influence animal behaviour are 
of primary concern’ (McKelvie & Solarz, 1966: 115) and caretakers with a ‘great love for 
animals’ were highly valued by the experimenters.  Indeed, a scale assessing ‘attitude 
towards animals’ was included on a short questionnaire which, it was recommended, other 
laboratories might use during recruitment in order to avoid ‘personnel problems’ in their 
colony (McKelvie & Solarz, 1966: 112).  It is also worth noting that employees who could 
not form caring relations with other humans, those who were ‘not in accord with fellow 
workers’ (McKelvie & Solarz, 1966: 110) were deemed to be similarly problematic. 
As has been shown above, a great deal of care was taken by the researchers to ensure that the 
experimental space took account of dogs’ affective needs and manipulated those affective 
qualities, for experimental ends, by controlling the frequency and form of interactions which 
animals experienced; this was the case both within and between species.  Increasingly, the 
researchers even began to collapse the species divide when it came to manipulating affective 
responses.  A number of years into the work at the Radiobiology Laboratory a psychologist, 
Andrew Solarz, began to work at the colony and, with spotting glasses in hand, Solarz 
engaged in long periods of observation from the top of a purpose built tower (Solarz, 1964: 
928).  One of the first papers which Solarz published concerned the impact of beagle-beagle 
relations upon human-beagle relations (Solarz, 1965).  What Solarz concluded was that dogs 
in the most utopic environments, those in ‘parallel possession’ of their pen where ‘interaction 
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was non-combative and neither dog showed...dominance – both dogs shared the cache [food] 
without observable friction’ (Solarz, 1965: 1254), were more likely to show ‘friendly’ 
behaviour towards caretakers, moving towards the humans and wagging their tails when they 
entered the dogs’ pen (Solarz, 1965: 1256), thus making them more amenable to 
experimental study.  Furthermore, because social behaviours could be learnt from both 
humans and beagles (Solarz, 1965: 1256), and because dominance hierarchies were reported 
to be more likely to occur when there was a significant disparity in the body-weight of a 
pen’s two dogs, beagle-beagle-human affect was a variable open to control (McKelvie et al, 
1971: 274).  Behavioural experiments such as these were only introduced nine years into the 
study (Solarz, 1964: 928) and because it had already been determined that pairs would be 
matched for life (Solarz, 1965: 1254) pairs were not altered in an attempt to effect affect.  
Nonetheless, this was a model colony, lessons were to be learned and taken forward, and the 
researchers explicitly recommended that others base their pairings with these findings in 
mind (McKelvie et al, 1971: 274).  A utopic environment, both physical and social, was to be 
positively strived for. 
The construction of this ‘beagle utopia’ illustrates how processes of affective trans-species 
communication (Despret, 2004), can not only accommodated but actively encouraged in 
animal research. At Davis care-taking practices were shaped by affect and documented, so as 
not to ‘forget’ these insights (as Davies suggests is commonly the case (2012)). It is 
problematic to frame the forms of care at Davis as opening space for new forms of ethics, 
however, let alone new research epistemologies, as these practices ultimately served to 
manufacture compliant animals, reinforced the experimental status quo and had consequences 
for both dogs and care-takers who resisted entering into affective-encounters.   
When care fails 
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What we have detailed above is a complex process of accommodation and manipulation in 
relation to care which was carried out with the intent of furthering experimental ends.  It 
needs to be noted, however, that there were instances wherein care and affective requirements 
could not be made to cohere to the demands of the experiment.  In these instances, the 
responses of the researchers were quite different.  Firstly, it has already been noted that the 
beagle’s ‘excellent disposition is the result of culling ill-tempered dogs throughout the history 
of the breed’ (Andersen, 1970: 4) and this act was repeated within Davis.  Out of the animals 
initially bought to form the breeding colony, ‘15 females and 1 male were culled because of 
undesirable characteristics’ (Andersen & Hart, 1955: 366).  Similarly, those employees who 
neither cared for the animals nor their fellow workers were not hired or, on more than one 
occasion, relieved of their duties (McKelvie & Solarz, 1966: 110).   
Individuals unsuitable for the experimental environment were not only those who showed a 
lack of care, as detailed above; caretakers who showed too much care were deemed similarly 
problematic.  For example, it is noted that ‘one employee gave certain dogs pet names’ 
(McKelvie & Solarz, 1966: 111).  There is no suggestion within the literature that this 
employee neglected the other animals and yet this lack of standardised treatment was deemed 
unacceptable for the experiment and was apparently stamped out.  Further, animals which 
attracted too much care were reportedly troublesome.  The researchers note: 
…one animal, considerably smaller than the others, was maintained until its 
death, at over ten years of age.  When autopsy was scheduled, none of the 
caretakers wanted to assist.  The implication is obvious.  What effect the 
constant attention of the caretakers may have had had is purely speculative, but 
was undoubtedly real. (McKelvie & Solarz, 1966: 111)  
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The recommendation is that future studies standardise their research subjects to prevent such 
an occurrence of ‘constant attention’.  Much as the beagles objected to the experiment with 
uneven coverage of their pens, the researchers found uneven courage of caregiving 
objectionable; the only manner in which these objections could be accommodated was 
through the removal of certain individuals, beagle or human, from the experimental space. 
A final affective quality that could not be made to cohere to the experimental regime is the 
beagles’ ‘loud penetrating bark, which can be heard from a great distance… almost any 
excuse will incite an entire colony to bark’ (Andersen, 1970: 6).  This bark is variously 
described as ‘objectionable’ (Andersen & Hart, 1955: 366) and ‘annoying’ (Andersen, 1955: 
409) and  appears to have been problematic for both those working at the facility and local 
residents (Andersen, 1955: 410).  Unlike digging, pacing, or jumping the bark of the beagle 
could not be controlled and, as a result, each animal at the Radiobiology Laboratory was 
‘debarked’ at the age three through a surgical procedure known as a ventriculocordectomy 
which, while not entirely eliminating the ability to bark, significantly reduced its volume 
(Andersen, 1955).   
We do not want to dismiss these seemingly uncaring practices, far from it.  However we are 
reluctant to suggest that these practices which are, after all, similarly aimed at manipulating 
affect within the confines of the experiment, should be understood separately to the instances 
of care detailed above.  Neither do we believe that the researchers’ claims of ‘kindness’ 
should be dismissed, post hoc, from an external position of judgement or in light of 
contemporary understandings of these practices as problematic. We need a theory of care 
which can simultaneously recognize that kindness and debarking are a product of the same 
affective perspectives, and which understands care as not only being open to manipulation 
but actively supporting instrumentalization.  
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Conclusion 
Within the existing literature, care has been seen as important for experimental research due 
to its capacity to support relations between researchers and research-subjects; relations which 
not only foster continuous ethical responsibility but engender new forms of knowledge. Care, 
firstly, has been framed as something mundane and tacit; an inevitable part of scientific 
research which nonetheless requires constant negotiation and tinkering in order to be 
accommodated by the systems it lies in uneasy relation with. The affective qualities of care, 
too, have been stressed; whilst good care does not assume a prescriptive form, it nonetheless 
relies on researchers being open to affective encounters. These interrelated arguments 
understand care as vital in creating space for research partners to speak back in ethically and 
epistemologically significant ways.  
At stake in care-relations, therefore, is making research open to the risk of new knowledge 
being produced, or existing ethical values being challenged. ‘Good science’ that holds 
potential for epistemological transformation, for instance, is repeatedly framed as being 
predicated on the ‘risk’ of being affected (Despret, 2013: 57; Haraway, 2008: 83; Latour, 
1997: xix; Stengers, 1997: 18).  Risk, too, is central to practices of ‘tinkering’ as ‘care seeks 
to lighten what is heavy, and even if it fails it keeps on trying’ (Mol et al, 2010: 14). Care 
should ensure that tensions between the different requirements of those engaged in research, 
and the risks involved, cannot be permanently resolved through drawing on predetermined 
values such as ‘inviolable animal rights’ or ‘human good is more important’ (Haraway, 2008: 
87). Davis, however, troubles these claims. 
The beagle colony at Davis had, at its core, practices of tinkering (as researchers 
experimented with different ways of creating the ‘most utopic’ environment for the dogs) and 
affect (with ordinarily tacit qualities such as ‘love’ and ‘kindness’ determining staff selection, 
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cage arrangements, care-taking routines and even pen surfacing). These approaches not only 
encouraged but necessitated the animals ‘speaking back’ and thus seemingly opened the 
potential for ethical responsibility and epistemological change. Ultimately, however, care was 
used to mould the dogs’ capacity to impose obligations on researchers. The beagle became an 
‘experimental dog’ whose objections and desires were pacified so that they could not threaten 
experimental goals and, ultimately, their behaviour strengthened – rather than troubled – the 
pre-determined ends of the experiment.  
Further, care was used to reveal qualities (or even specific agents) that resisted being-in-
relation and eliminate them. Dogs refusing care were labelled ‘bad tempered’ (and culled), 
conversely, care-takers had to demonstrate love to be employable. Such findings suggest that 
the power dynamics of risk matter in significant ways. In the beagle colony the risk for 
researchers, for instance, was that their research did not go as planned, but lessons could still 
be learned for future colonies (as when they learned about the importance of paired animals’ 
weight). The risk for the animals, however, was fatal, as beagles died in the months when 
these adjustments were on-going. Similarly, when care-takers took the risk of being affected 
this was seen as a problem and even led to individuals losing their jobs. The point of 
highlighting these tensions at Davis, however, is not to suggest that they are anomalies that 
can be resolved through ‘more care’ or ‘better care’. Instead we propose that the beagles of 
Davis demonstrate a need to complicate existing characterisations of care.  
To move towards this more complex account of care, building on concerns that have been 
articulated within existing care-theories, we argue that further attention should be paid to the 
histories (Greenhough & Roe, 2011), contexts (Johnson, 2015) and exclusions (Puig de la 
Bellacasa, 2011) that lie behind caring encounters (from the shaping of particular breeds, to 
the instrumentalization of affect within the laboratory). This approach, however, needs to be 
coupled with careful consideration of the role of care itself in manufacturing compliance, in 
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order to ensure that a lack of obvious ‘objection’ is not equated with consent. While care can 
highlight exclusions (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011) it can also foster them and, in order to guard 
against this, researchers’ ethical obligations should move beyond immediate somatic 
relations, to take into account the disparate agents who were shaped or even excluded in the 
process of facilitating productive relations of care. Drawing attention to exclusions, histories 
and the ambivalent role of care is, we maintain, important in ‘staying with the trouble’ by 
crafting more complex notions of ethical responsibility that maintain space for 
epistemological change. 
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Notes 
 
1 Though Heideggerian understandings of being as being intertwined with care have been pivotal to critical 
analyses of human exceptionalism, the theoretical approaches that are drawn on here have displayed wariness of 
this framework (see Haraway, 2008: 334, 368; Johnson, 2015: 301). For a re-working of Heidegger in relation to 
animal studies, see Acampora, 2006: 6-14. 
2 This is not to infer that ‘affect’ has been treated as an unproblematic ‘good’. Lauren Berlant, for instance, 
highlights the manipulative role that affect can play in maintaining certain social inequalities. While Berlant’s 
emphasis on affective environments frames affect in a slightly different way to the body of work drawn on here 
her work could provide a useful avenue for future work.  
3 The beagle colonies at  Davis were in line with a long lineage of research that took animal affect into account 
alongside scientific and economic imperatives: Beginning with experimental physiology in the late 19th century 
(Dror, 1999); continuing into the 20th century as animal science became more regulated (Lederer, 1992); and 
culminating in the standardization of laboratory animals from the late 1940s (Kirk, 2014). The UC-D 
experiments also informed subsequent research, giving rise to formal sets of guidelines about how to manage the 
affective qualities of laboratory dogs (Andersen, 1970) and continue to inform practice (e.g. Tomkins et al, 
2011).  
 
Figure 1. The outdoor kennel facilities of ‘Project Six’, University of California Davis. The 
key features of the colony are clearly discernible; each rectangular pen houses two beagles 
Eva Giraud and Gregory Hollin 
 
26 
 
(visible in the nearest pen) and each pen corners onto three others, allowing ‘muzzle contact’ 
between 8 dogs. A covered walkway, allowing caretakers access to the pens, can also be 
seen. The pens themselves feature two half-barrels which provide shade, a lookout post, and a 
kennel. The floor of each pen is covered in crushed rock. In the background can be seen a 30 
ft. tower designed to allow observation of the colony by a resident psychologist. Reprinted 
with permission from Defining the Laboratory Animal (1971: 265) by the National Academy 
of Sciences, Courtesy of the National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.   
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